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I t’s a funny thing. If you turn to virtually any issue in philosophy of mind,Cartesian dualism will loom large in the background, and rightly—but it does
so in a particular way. Of course, it is a powerful and, in many ways, intuitive the-
ory. Surely we have mental states, they are often clearly distinct from whatever
intentional actions they go on to cause, and it is not obvious how we can identify
consciousness, the experience of that fireplace with any purely material state or
process. Fine. At the same time, everybody knows the theory cannot be right, for
all sorts of reasons. But central is this: Cartesian dualism is just too stark, as it
were; the framework within which we characterize what is and is not possible is
just too meager. Too many features of our psychological and intentional life do
not fit easily or naturally into “mind” or “body” as Descartes thought he was
forced to understand these ideas. Mental states are clearly, must be, materially in-
stantiated; they could not have their properties any other way. Certain behavior,
like painting a landscape, is intrinsically intentional. And so we tend to begin our
explorations into some topic in mind with Cartesian dualism in the background,
but as a cautionary tale as much as anything else. It would be the odd philosopher,
something of an ideologue, who would want to wind up at the end of their analy-
sis with these categories, these rigid distinctions, wholly intact. To the contrary,
we look for an analysis of mental life and intentional action that is more flexible,
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more subtle than what Descartes thought he was constrained by, an analysis not
hostage to these old, unhelpful, crude categories.
But in that branch of moral theory known as meta-ethics, it is very much
otherwise. Here the dominant, and understandably dominant, dualism in the back-
ground is Hume’s. Hume’s dualism, as I will call it, is as brilliant, as seductive,
and as straightforward as Descartes’. There is the world of facts, which in turn
are divided into natural facts and “abstract ideas,” and we detect such facts with a
distinct faculty, “reason.” This faculty represents such facts, and as such, it can-
not be thought to cause action, or "supply a motive." Then there is the realm of
feeling, or states, inside of us. Sometimes such states arise biologically (hunger,
our love of children). And sometimes they are caused by how the external world
impinges upon us (pain from being burned, finding smells disgusting). But this
is the essential framework: facts out there, where what “facts” are is to be un-
derstood wholly within the constraints of naturalism, and feelings inside, where
these feelings, or motives, or desires, are to be understood in terms of the state of
affairs they seek to bring about, not in terms of representing anything, and so not
capable of being termed true or false.
When we turn to morality, two sorts of arguments, one from each part of this
duality, support a certain picture of moral concepts and moral discourse. When
we look out at the world of facts, we can find, initially, no place for moral notions.
Goodness does not name a natural fact, it is not discovered through empirical in-
vestigation—just go look and see if you can find it, one might say!—nor is it
plausibly thought of as an “abstract idea” (what expressivists today would call a
discrete metaphysical entity). Arguing from the other half of our ontology, clearly
moral qualities sometimes motivate. We sometimes act otherwise when we dis-
cover we are about to be rude, for example, or do something simply because we
believe it is just; this cannot be denied. But motivated action cannot be caused by
a mere representation of the world. So we have two sorts of arguments, one from
each part of the world we have so divided, for the single truth: morality is essen-
tially about feelings, responses, which then cause certain sorts of actions.
I do not want to suggest this picture has survived whole, even for those who
essentially adhere to it. No one I think would now characterize desires, or moti-
vations, exactly as Hume did. Expressivists nowadays typically think of desires
as having semantic content; they are certainly not “brute states” as Hume seemed
to understand this idea. But these differences, or modifications, are I think quite
modest in comparison to the degree to which the fundamental framework, the du-
alism, continues to be invoked to support some very powerful conclusions. First,
in the seemingly undeniable fact that morality motivates, we have the beginnings
of an argument for telling us what normative concepts name, what normative
properties are. And in the world of facts, as we must understand that idea if we
are to be sensible, we will find no moral properties. The world apart from our re-
actions, apart from our feelings, bears no moral content at all.
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It is not that these arguments strongly “influence” contemporary expres-
sivism. Almost three hundred years since the publication of The Treatise, these
arguments are being made more or less exactly as they were then. And what is
invisible, what cannot be seen, when within Hume’s dualism, is invariably invis-
ible when within contemporary expressivism too. The result, I shall argue, is a
deep distortion of the subject matter from the start that is then typically elaborated
upon with great imagination.
Michael Ridge’s Impassioned Belief is I believe a very vivid case in point.
Ridge has defended his version of expressivism, Ecumenical Expressivism, be-
fore; Impassioned Belief is not only a book length treatment of his view, it also
gives Ridge the chance to take up at greater length several topics central to any
version of expressivism: the connection between morality and feeling, the best
way to understand the normative generally, why cognitivism cannot be right, how
an expressivist can think of truth, and so forth. Those who know Ridge’s argu-
ment from previous articles might well find the presentation of the distinctive
themes of Ecumenical Expressivism here actually a bit more opaque than in the
past (I certainly did); to that end, in what follows, I allow myself to refer to lan-
guage from one of these earlier essays too. Naturally, the account Ridge offers in
Impassioned Belief is also far more comprehensive; this is especially so when it
comes to Ridge’s commitments in language and mind. Readers particularly inter-
ested in Ridge’s elaborate arguments in philosophy of language will find a great
deal here.
But that said, Ridge’s ambitious, multifaceted argument almost everywhere
rests on these unexamined Humean assumptions. And because this framework
actually renders morality, and the normative generally, invisible, since it turns
normative judgment and normative justification into something else (a reaction,
a feeling, a decision to embrace a plan, whatever), the work is filled with fun-
damental errors and bad arguments. Not about language, of course; that would
never happen. The level of sophistication about language is positively military.
No; the casual nature of the arguments, the unexamined assumptions, the ease
with which all sorts of questionable, sometimes truly ridiculous, assertions are
made, the failure to take up at all seriously the complexity of the subject—these
features of the book invariably arise when the author takes up morality. Ridge
gets morality so wrong so pervasively, and with so little care, this book is bound
to become a classic, beloved by meta-ethicists everywhere. Not since Mackie
have I read a work allegedly about morality, or the normative, with so little inter-
est in, or intuitive feel for, the subject.
In what follows, I will take up some of the central themes. Some, like the par-
ticular picture of the relation between morality and feeling expressivists favor,
are common to expressivists everywhere. Others, like the account of moral judg-
ment as kind of hybrid state, with a representational belief component, are quite
distinctive to Ridge.
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But before getting into any of this, let me say a bit more about the value of
the book overall. If you are already an expressivist, this book will be of great
interest to you. There is a lot of discussion of philosophy of language and to a
lesser extent philosophy of mind, and an attempt to present expressivism within
a “unified” view of these domains. Conversely, if you are hoping to see a version
of expressivism that at last takes up the various features of morality that expres-
sivism does not easily fit, this book is quite frustrating, largely an annoyance.
The powerful intuitions to the contrary that fail to be taken up are not whatever
is available so long as we stay within the Humean framework; it is not “realism”
or “cognitivism” as such things would be within Humean dualism that fail to be
examined. Naturally, there is adequate treatment of that. It is rather the absence
of any attempt to construct a conception of the normative distinct from what is
available when within the Humean framework that renders the central argument
so unsatisfactory. The shadow of Humean dualism continues to fall on other-
wise sophisticated philosophical treatments of normative judgment, and the deep,
structural limitations of that framework are passed on wholesale. Descartes fa-
mously worried that if the foundation of his argument was not sound, all that was
built upon that foundation would be subject to thoroughgoing challenge too. He
very much got that right.
SOME CENTRAL TOPICS: SO WHAT EXACTLY ARE WE TALKING
ABOUT, TO BEGIN WITH?
From the start, the idea of “the normative” is put forward in a deeply idiosyncratic
way. It is essentially what grows out of our ability to deliberate rationally about
our action, so long as there is some concern about the outcome. And so, from the
start, “the normative” is tied essentially to what goes on when making a decision-
—any decision, it turns out. Ridge opens his first chapter, “Locating Normative
Discourse” with the following allegedly paradigmatic illustration of the norma-
tive:
If we are being especially careful and systematic [when reflecting on our
options], we might even list what we take to be the “pros” and “cons” of
the most salient of our options to help us figure out what to do. In doing
so, we seem to presuppose that there are right and wrong answers to the
question, “What should I do?” Indeed, it sometimes matters deeply to us
that we answer this question correctly. For example, an agent might well
wonder whether it makes sense to have a child. She realizes that this will in-
volve large sacrifices of her other interests and projects. On the other hand,
she also feels that it would significantly enrich her life, providing a kind of
deep meaning and fulfillment. Clearly, people making such momentous de-
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cisions typically care deeply that they make decisions which are sensible.
How, though, should such competing and very different values sensibly be
weighed against one another? Even more deeply, how can one rationally
determine whether either really even is a genuine value?
It is no exaggeration to say that asking and answering questions about
how we ought to live is an essential part of the human condition. We care
deeply about getting the answers right, yet we are unclear about how to be
sure we are getting them right. On reflection, we can become unsure just
what could make a given answer right. We can even become unsure what
the questions are even really about. This book is, very roughly, about these
kinds of practical questions. More broadly, this book is about the kind of
thought and discourse employed in asking and answering such questions. I
call such thought and discourse “practically normative.” (15-16)
A lot is going on in this passage; a careful reader is alerted to a great deal of the
necessary stage setting. First, notice the easy-going equivocation between “the
sensible” and “the right,” or, to put the point a different way, notice how “the
right” is here put forward as just part of a list of terms we might understandably
use in assessing personal decisions. Of course, there is a use for “right” in this
way; I take that to be obvious. So I might say, “It was quite the right decision for
me to have a child.” And here I mean: this turned out to make me happy. I submit
this is a very different sort of use than what we see in, “When Truman inte-
grated the armed forces, he was quite right to do so.” Before reading this passage
of Ridge’s, I would have thought that the paradigmatic case of “the normative”
might have been the second use, the use of the term that means something like
“morally justified” or “admits of moral justification.” But ah no, it is not. We
are in Jean-Paul Sartre country now; it is the personal decision, the weighing of
options, by an earnest, free self, that gives us the central setting for, and so the
central logic of, “the normative.” And so, the moral, from the start, is going to be
just a species of this larger, more general category—assessment of options with
some interest in the outcome, and to study “the normative,” (and so the moral),
is just to study the means and mechanisms by which we come to make important
personal decisions. The idea that the moral might traffic in properties or states
of affairs that we either recognize or fail to acknowledge (as is illustrated in the
Truman-integration example) is never given a chance from the start. This (to me
fairly intuitive idea) is defined away, literally, on the very first page.
To me, this woman’s dilemma is only with some strain thought of as raising
“normative” matters in the first place. What she worries about is what course of
action will make her happy, and I see nothing interesting about “the normative” in
the undeniable platitude that we usually worry about our happiness when making
important decisions in life. And because we know we cannot always anticipate our
desires and proclivities in the future, in this case, there is a certain amount of spec-
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ulation or uncertainty that no amount of “reflection” can wholly dissipate. At the
same time, we know we are biological creatures, hard wired to love our children,
and so we know that there is a good chance that we will love the child we have
however much we give up in becoming parents. Perhaps I’m crazy, but I did not see
anything “normative” in any of that. Why take this story as illustrating anything?
So on my view, this story, and the sort of thing it is an instance of, very much
mislocates the subject matter from the start. We are offered something far too
wide as it were—it is something like “personal decision with some interest in the
outcome.” Of course, when making such personal decisions, sometimes we do
worry about (what I would call) the normative; of that there is no question. For
example, we might worry whether we really do have a personal obligation to give
to the desperately poor in disadvantaged countries, and if we do have such an
obligation, how much personal sacrifice we ought, in taking up this obligation,
to accept. And if we don’t happen to have this worry that solicitation from Ox-
fam will try to make sure that we do. There can be no doubt about that. But it
hardly follows that the best way into that issue is by examining mental processes
or the nature of deliberation as such. It begs the question to argue that, because
we deliberate about normative matters, or where a normative predicate most lies
(which action is the most just? which act is the more obligatory—the very stuff
of tragedy) that “the normative” is to be found in deliberation.
Consider the counterpart point made of normative concepts in the law. If
you are on a jury, you must deliberate about whether the nightclub owner was
negligent, whether he took, or failed to take, “reasonable” precautions against
a “foreseeable” danger. Against the right fact pattern, this is tough stuff, and a
lot of film agony has been made out of what goes on in the heads of jurors in
a jury room. But clearly any talk of “deliberation” is derivative. “Negligence”
will have a certain abstract definition in a certain jurisdiction, criteria for appli-
cation, and jurors are charged with trying to apply that concept of “negligence”
correctly. (That’s of course why it is so hard.) Just because we deliberate about
negligence, “trying to get it right” one might say, shows absolutely nothing about
how the concept of negligence is best understood. It is no accident that Ridge
does not give us, as his example of “deliberation,” someone on a Hague tri-
bunal wondering whether Nenad Banovic really is a war criminal, or someone on
an arts committee wondering whether William Vollmann’s work really is origi-
nal enough to deserve a grant. He does not like the deliberation to be about the
application of (what I would call) some normative concept with more or less par-
adigmatic cases, more or less clear criteria, governing its use; that would then
shift the attention to the concept.
And this point leads us to another. Unsurprisingly, the central normative con-
cepts as Ridge will understand “the normative” will be those that can stand in for
“approval,” “endorsement” and the like—indicia of success, or satisfaction, in de-
liberation, abstractly conceived. This is what “good”—the alleged granddaddy of
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all normative language—and so the morally good—means: what we can approve
or endorse. And when we construe “the good” or “the morally good” this way,
there is now no logical or intrinsic conceptual connection between “the good” and
the content laden normative language we employ in (what I would call) related
domains, like art and the law. Ridge, like all expressivists, is superbly consistent
in this regard. You will find no entrance in the index for “aesthetics” or “law” nor
is there any mention of any particular theory of judgment in these domains—no
entrance for Ronald Dworkin, or Clive Bell. (This is not hyperbole.) From the
start, there is a resolute, unruffled disinterest in how normative language in devel-
oped, constructed domains actually works. Such things are not even on his radar.
This mistake has been with us since Moore—the idea that “the good” can be
understood, is best understood, in a way that has no connection whatsoever to
related notions in related domains (e.g., “the just,” “the deserved,” “the rightly
punished”). It seems very strange to me to have a theory of “the morally good” in
which it is conceivable that we could, for example, have a complete conception
of justice say—one on which we all agreed and all agreed to be as well justified
as is imaginable—and this fact have no implications whatsoever for “the morally
good” or the best theory for how to understand this concept. The idea that the
criteria for judgment in other normative domains might have no implications for
how to understand what we might mean by “good” as it operates in our moral life
strikes me as all wrong. I take it as obvious that this thought, or thought experi-
ment, would have struck Mill (or Kant) as just about incoherent—but we are now
in a world where what Mill or Kant thought about “the morally good” is of no
interest to anyone.
This is the conceptual point, that “the morally good” is conceptually con-
nected to other normative concepts in other domains, and to ignore this will
generate certain serious limitations or artificialities in one’s treatment of morality.
I make this point in a somewhat preliminary way now, because I will return to it
in greater length below; it is crucial to assessing the famous argument Hare makes
regarding “good” that Ridge repeats and relies on so significantly. Then, separate
from this, is a point about practice. The way other normative domains actually
work, how judgments are assessed or disputes structured, may have something to
teach us about moral language and argument too. This is particularly so, and un-
surprisingly so, with the law and legal life. I say it is “unsurprising” because after
all, our moral life grew out of more primitive forms of social cooperation, tribal
understandings and the like—just as our law did. Morality and law are, I submit,
like man and ape in the Darwinian story, or like cosmology and literature—they
each have exactly the same ancestor, the same form of life figuring in the causal
story in the background. It would be very surprising if there were nothing to be
learned about the nature of moral predication, moral disagreement, even moral
motivation, by looking at the law. It would be very surprising because in fact, as
I will show, it is very much not true. Ridge’s theory of Ecumenical Expressivism
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fails to take up what a concurrence is in the law, the agreement in outcome that
stems from very different readings of the law (I do not think he even knows about
this category), and his account of what it is for two moral agents to mean, or not
to mean, the same, or different, things in their judgment is accordingly quite un-
sophisticated. (This is not to say his account of what is going on is semantically
unsophisticated—hardly!) This, too, is a point to which I will return.
Well, theories are theories, and if this is the best one, then so be it; the dislo-
cations it would seem to require of us will in that case just have to be swallowed.
After all, it is not obvious that time will slow down as we approach the speed of
light either, but, since that is what the best theory requires we say, we better do
our best to accommodate the idea. Let us now turn to some of the reasons Ridge,
and expressivists generally, go this way, construe the normative along these lines.
Let us look at what they understand their only opponents—“cognitivists”—to be,
and why they feel that given that alternative, whatever difficulties there may be
with expressivism, this is the theory to affirm and make better. And finally, let
us look at the distinctive form of expressivism we have with Ridge, Ecumenical
Expressivism.
THE METAPHYSICAL ARGUMENT, THE ARGUMENT FROM MORAL
DISAGREEMENT
Expressivism, in this debate as it presently stands, is in contrast to descriptivism.
A descriptivist account of a normative judgment takes its propositional content to
“represent” “normative properties” and/or “normative facts.” But the prefix “nor-
mative” adds nothing to the ontology available to us without it. The properties
and facts a descriptivist, within this framework, must say a normative judgment
“represents” may be understood to be, or to reduce to, natural properties and
facts. Or perhaps, in frustration with naturalism, yet determined to be factual
about the good all the same (Moore’s argument in a nutshell), we turn instead, or
simply posit, some irreducibly non-natural metaphysical entity. There is also the
possibility that such facts are of a different kind altogether, constructed products
of human intentionality. But expressivists only rarely take that third possibility
seriously. Ridge very much embodies the more typical strand of expressivism
when he writes:
It is at this point [where cognitivism is judged trapped by the unsatisfactory
consequences of naturalist reduction, whether such reduction is understood
along analytic or synthetic lines—SR] that expressivism comes into its
own. The expressivist gambit is to reject the cognitivist’s representational-
ist order of explanation. On the expressivist approach, we do not start with
normative states of the world and explain normative judgment as cognizing
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them. Rather, we start with normative judgment and its distinctively prac-
tical functional role. Normative judgments function to settle “the thing to
do,” and normative conversation allows us to deliberate together about the
thing to do… (101-106)
This pattern of argument [regarding truth] should seem familiar: it is
precisely the pattern of argument used to motivate expressivism. In both
cases, we find a meaningful predicate which persistently evades a plausible
reductive analysis, but which cannot plausibly be understood as denoting a
metaphysically primitive property. We therefore revisit our methodology.
Instead of starting with metaphysical theorizing about the referent of the
predicate in question, we begin with theorizing about the meaning of the
predicate. Having concluded that meaning should be understood in terms of
state of mind expressed, we next ask what sort of state of mind is expressed
by declarative sentences in which this predicate is used. We then conclude
that when used in assertoric discourse, at least, the predicate functions to
express something other than a robustly representational belief. Instead, it
functions to express some sort of pro-attitude… (201-202)
Here we see the Humean framework in all its confident, exclusionary glory. Note
the possibilities of “reference,” the range of what normative language might refer
to, that, once exhausted, inexorably drive us towards an analysis that understands
normative language as instead expressing a state of mind, a “pro-attitude.” We
have natural facts, and combinations thereof, and metaphysically primitive enti-
ties. We are very much in Hume’s world now. It is perhaps not quite identical to
“matters of fact” on one hand and “relations of ideas” on the other. The “ideas”
that Hume speaks of, such as those of mathematics or geometry, could certainly
be thought of as human constructions. Here, the expressivist argument refers to
non-natural facts that must be thought of as “out there” in just the same way
that natural ones are. But given that 1) the “meaningful predicate” “persistently
evades” “a plausible reductive analysis” on one hand (consider the willful murder
in all its facts and relations and the vice entirely escapes you, as Ridge’s more
famous ancestor might have put it), and 2) the idea that good might refer to a non-
natural entity is rightly seen as not very plausible either, (if we took “good” to be
an “abstract relation,” then it would have no intrinsic connection to human inter-
ests; Hume again), then 3) we must understand the predicate in terms of a “state
of mind expressed” (‘tis only when you turn your attention towards your own
breast…). Given what we have just ruled out, and that the term appears meaning-
ful, appears stable, we must see moral language as non-factual, moral claims as
non-representational, and moral judgments as simply expressive.
I say Ridge embodies the strand of expressivist argument that does not take
the third sort of fact very seriously for just this reason. There is no mention of any
other sort of fact at all in this argument. Nor does this bother Ridge; he never even
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takes up a candidate predicate that appears to evade this framework, and to show
that such a possibility is illusory after all. How can Ridge assert so blandly that
this exhausts the range of how terms refer? I believe that this blandness, this con-
fidence, is in fact just Hume’s framework speaking. Given that moral discourse
cannot be said to track either Platonic entities or reduce to any naturalistic pred-
icate, it must name a non-representational psychological state. But this argument
completely truncates the alternatives out there, the actual possibilities. When we
turn to accomplishment (and failure) concepts, we have the model we need. Con-
sider: expressive, original, when said of art; witty, clever, insightful, when said
of novels or philosophy (or persons); negligent, malicious, (or not), when said
of defendants on trial; fair, unfair, when said of wages or policies… it is a long
list, and it is not hard to keep going. Does anyone think for a moment such con-
cepts name things in the world, where that is understood as some combination of
natural predicates, with distinct causal powers, or, to the contrary, supersensible
“entities” apart from the natural world (“Yes,” we might imagine G.E. Moore as-
suring us in law school, “negligent is negligent and there is nothing else to say
about it.”) or simply refer to “pro-attitudes,” inner states that must be thought as
having no representational content? That would be an interesting way to construe
a verdict of, e.g., “insightfulness” regarding Proust’s treatment of sexual jealousy,
as having no representational content! Such terms embody the essence of the nor-
mative, one might think—but they are invisible in Ridge’s picture of the possible,
given his uncritical reliance on the Humean framework.
Well, so what, the defender of expressivism might say. So Ridge left some
things out you wish he hadn’t. And maybe as a general account of what is pos-
sible, how certain important parts of our language work, or refer, his argument
suffers accordingly. But that does not mean he got good wrong. There are plenty
of reasons to think he got “good” quite right. And one of the more powerful rea-
sons to think that this is the right approach to take with respect to “good”—i.e., to
see it as naming a non-representational state of “approval” or “endorsement”—is
that this construal allows us to make the best sense of moral disagreement. Ridge,
to his enduring credit, acknowledges his debt to R.M. Hare here, reproducing
Hare’s example of moral disagreement and the argument that, if such disagree-
ment is to be preserved, and to be thought as genuinely meaningful, then “good”
cannot be construed any other way.
First Hare (the passage is from The Language of Morals and is reproduced in
its entirety in Ridge, p. 75):
Let us suppose that a missionary, armed with a grammar book, lands on a
cannibal island. The vocabulary of his grammar book gives him the equiva-
lent, in the cannibal’s language, of the English word ‘good.’ Let us suppose
that, by a strange coincidence, the word is ‘good.’ And let us suppose also,
that it really is the equivalent—that it is, as the Oxford English Dictionary
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puts it, ‘the most general adjective of commendation’… If the missionary
has mastered his vocabulary, he can, so long as he uses the word evalu-
atively and not descriptively, communicate with them about morals quite
happily. They know that when he uses the word he is commending the per-
son or object that he applies it to. The only thing they find odd is that he
applies it to such unexpected people, people who are meek and gentle and
do not collect large quantities of scalps; whereas they themselves are accus-
tomed to commend people who are bold and burly and collect more scalps
than the average.
Now Ridge:
Return again to Hare’s example of the cannibals. On the synthetic reduc-
tionist account, the cannibals’ use of ‘good’ refers to some descriptive
property which scalping people has, while the missionary’s use of ‘good’
refers to some property which scalping people lacks… [I]t will follow that
when the missionary says ‘scalping people is not good’ he says something
true, and when the cannibals say the equivalent of ‘scalping people is good’
they say something true too. (91-92)
In other words, if good referred to some property, then when people disagree,
they must in fact be naming different properties. And voila! Now we cannot say
they are “really disagreeing” after all, since each use tracks a different property.
Therefore, “good” does not name a property; it names, instead, “commending” or
“approval” or anything else along these lines.
It is surprising this example, so (rightly) central to the expressivist argument,
is not subjected to a bit more critical scrutiny. Suppose we were to substitute “de-
served” in the right way and rephrase the dispute accordingly. Surely this is a
fair move (whatever “fair” might mean). So now we have the missionary saying
something like: “Your enemies do not deserve to be scalped and eaten.” And the
cannibal says, “Yes, they do deserve to be scalped and eaten.” Now that the dis-
pute between them has been rephrased in these terms, it seems to me pretty clear
that the cannibal is simply wrong. Absent a further story, these enemy combat-
ants do not deserve this treatment when they are captured in battle. And let’s be
careful here. There is no reason to say the cannibal and the missionary are using a
word (now the word would be “deserve”) with “different meaning,” and so “they
do not really disagree.” This is a completely artificial and implausible interpreta-
tion of the dispute. They have different theories of desert (different conceptions,
if you will); they categorize those who deserve and those who do not deserve a
certain sort of respect differently. It is probably the case that the cannibal does
not even employ the concept of “a person”—there is the tribe, there are enemies
(and strangers, of course, to whom you probably have to show hospitality once
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they are shown not to be enemies) and that is that. For the missionary, there are
persons, and as such, they deserve respect, even in battle, or when captured in
battle. But when framed this way, it seems obvious to me that the cannibal is
wrong. By employing a theory of desert that does not in turn follow the con-
cept of the person, the cannibal makes a mistake, or, to use the language I think
more appropriate for normative assessment, offers a theory that is substantially
less justifiable than that of the missionary. (And I generally don’t like to agree
with missionaries.) The concept of a person is a central concept in any plausible
version of moral thought. I won’t defend this claim to any real degree here; I will
content myself with the alarmist argument that, if you don’t think this, then you
really cannot avoid the most corrosive forms of relativism. Anyone can get out of
anything by subdividing persons into those who do and those who do not deserve
respect along whatever contingent lines you like, and this subdivision cannot be
challenged. Genocide is now not really genocide, you see, because it was not re-
ally persons who were targeted, just Jews, just Tutsis. No expressivist wants this
result (whether they can avoid it is another matter) so I am going to assume the
expressivist will swallow the point about persons. It is hard to avoid acknowl-
edging that 1) morality takes up what we owe to persons—it surely is not about
choosing wallpaper—and 2) that the persons/non-persons distinction cannot be
understood to be governed by choice, or the intentions of the speaker. We may
not want to blame the innocent cannibal for getting it wrong, of course. That is
another matter, an easy one. But we cannot think his theory, his conception, is
just as good as, is on a par with his missionary adversary. We cannot think it be-
cause it isn’t so. Enemies, it happens, really are persons too. This is something
one can get right, or get wrong.
The moral of the above argument is this. Sometimes what looks like a
stopping point in moral analysis is in fact just the beginning. The seemingly in-
tractable different uses of “good” mask different conceptions of desert (in this
case), conceptions we can, in this case, easily assess for plausibility. “Good” may
or may not operate as Hare and Ridge say it does. I really could not care. If we
say they are right, then we must also say that “good,” the concept, turns out not to
be so important when doing moral philosophy after all. And of course, we might
equally say, they are not right: the concept, when used in a moral context, is best
thought of as deeply, importantly linked to others that, once before us, must be
thought as answerable to assessment, may not be thought of as governed by “in-
tentions” or “pro-attitudes” at all.
THE CONNECTION TO FEELING
Crucial to any expressivist argument is the claim that, quite apart from the
strengths or advantages of expressivism as a position in meta-ethics, moral life,
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moral judgment, just is deeply connected to feeling, and that the expressivist
alone gets this fact right. On this issue, the expressivist argues that if we just look
at the object discipline, just look at what actually goes on when people make and
support their judgments, the expressivist orientation is vindicated. The expres-
sivist meta-ethical analysis, that moral judgment expresses a pro attitude, rather
than anything like a belief with representational content, best mirrors this deep
fact about morality.
Well, what sort of fact is this anyway? How are we to understand the role of
feeling in moral judgment? That people often get excited about moral judgments
is hardly terribly interesting. Many in New York City get far more excited about
real estate than about anything else (and justly); no one would say statements
about real estate prices essentially reflect a pro-attitude. No, the point is, that
when you really press moral judgments, it turns out they can survive the disap-
pearance of everything else, the disappearance that is of any fact, or the detection
of any fact, in the world you care to name. They are, it turns out, essentially just
feelings from the start. Here is Ridge:
In one frequently cited study, American college students were asked to con-
sider a case in which a brother and sister have sex with one another. In
the example, the siblings consent to have sex, use contraception, enjoy it,
find that it strengthens their relationship, do it rarely… and keep it a se-
cret. Eighty percent of the subjects judged this was morally wrong but they
found it very hard to give any sort of cogent account of why it was wrong.
Subjects typically cited concerns about deformed children, but were re-
minded that contraception was used. Other subjects cited worries about the
impact on the community but were reminded that the sex was a well-kept
secret. Subjects tended to admit that the counter arguments successfully
refuted the reasons they gave for their judgment, but only 17 percent actu-
ally changed their judgment. The majority simply held onto their view and
tended to just give up on principled argument. Instead, they tended simply
to express their feelings, making remarks like “incest is nasty!”… [T]he
best explanation of the ‘dumbfounding phenomena’ [where speakers can no
longer explain why they continue to hold the view they do] is that speak-
ers’ moral classifications reflect their immediate emotional responses. The
reasons they give for that classification are post hoc rationalizations which
do not really explain why they make the judgments they do. If the reasons
given for the subjects’ normative classification were the real explanation of
their judgment then one would expect it to be abandoned when those rea-
sons were debunked by the subjects’ own lights…
[I]t is plausible that affect plays a similar role in at least some of our
non-moral normative judgments. For example, if we think someone is act-
ing foolishly, we will tend to pity them… (59-60; last italics: SR)
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What is remarkable about this passage, this story, is that it never occurs to
Ridge that it might, on reflection, support exactly the opposite picture of moral
judgment than the one he thinks right. This particular example is so rigged in
particular ways, it must be handled with tongs, but of that more below. The
more general phenomenon is indeed a genuine one, and it deserves some thought.
Sometimes indeed people affirm what seems to be a moral judgment and cannot,
on reflection, really say why; cannot, on reflection, claim the reasons they had
for the judgment in fact apply as they initially may have thought. Typically, as
is the case here, such “judgments” have to do with sex, and draw on the deep,
visceral role sex plays in our affective lives. I do not think this is at all irrelevant,
and I am skeptical whether this case could be extended to cases where no such
elemental force is in play. For example, I very much doubt a counterpart experi-
ment structured around judgments about what is wrong with theft, say, or what is
wrong with murder, could ever lead us to think there is nothing more than some
inchoate, unjustified “feeling” behind such judgments (of course, Ridge is free to
try and prove me wrong—survey away). And so: I do not think cases like this,
judgments about incest (or bestiality, or sex with corpses), are at all central; they
cannot be put forward as paradigmatic. But never mind; let’s say they are and
pursue the point. Even as they stand, such cases do not show what Ridge here
takes them to show.
Sometimes these judgments remain largely dormant; we are not usually called
upon to make judgments about bestiality say, and so the degree to which such
judgments do not hook on to well supported reasons (if that is so) goes unnoticed.
But sometimes the opposite happens. Social change forces a population to con-
front how well founded such previously unexamined judgments happen to be. And
typically, if such judgments are not well founded, are in fact based on no more
than some visceral response we cannot otherwise justify, then such judgments lose
their authority, are abandoned. The place to see this point vindicated is in public
life, where moral judgments deemed to be no longer supported by reasons are no
longer enforced. Consider the judgment that homosexual behavior is just wrong.
This judgment is still with us of course, but it is nowhere near as widespread as it
once was. And the main point is, while some do feel it, very few have any appetite
for enforcing whatever anti-sodomy laws still remain on the books, I take that as
obvious. (These would be very easy arrests to secure.) Many might say “I still feel
there is something wrong here, but I certainly don’t think these people should be
punished for this behavior.” Well, if you feel that, how wrong do you really think
it is after all? If there is no harm, no disutility, then the judgment tends to wither,
tends to remain I would say only as a trace of a more robust judgment, one that
was actually supported by reasons we once thought we could endorse. (Usually
appeals to God, when no real reason can come to your aid).
Along these lines, consider the “feelings” people may have continued to have
about inter-racial marriage in a past generation even after the Loving case. Con-
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sider our confusion about prostitution, by which I mean, our uncertainty as to
whether this really is wrong. Consider how “seduction” was once a crime, once
actionable, now no longer. Ridge never looks to our public life and to the way
in which some judgments are no longer enforced as showing anything. Au con-
traire, mon frere, the withdrawal of a judgment from the sphere of what is to be
enforced shows everything. It shows there is just the feeling, the trace of a past
habit. It is now no longer a judgment which we feel can be justified by reference
to public reasons, and when that is the case, then these “judgments,” I submit,
are but half way houses, incomplete judgments, not full judgments after all. What
else does the disinclination to enforce show? Take away the reference to harm,
or rights, or consent, or to whatever else might count as a reason, and Ridge is
right—then there is nothing but the feeling. But now it is not clear we still have
before us a moral judgment! To the contrary—this is no judgment at all. No jus-
tification story, you say, only mere feeling? Fine; then you just have the shell, the
empty chrysalis. Ridge takes the inexplicable assertion “I just know it’s wrong”
or “it’s just nasty, I can’t say why!” to give us the essence of moral judgment. But
this simply, incredibly, begs the question in favor of his dogma. I don’t see this
as the essence of moral judgment at all, and I would need a real argument (not a
baptism ceremony) to be persuaded otherwise. If you look at our actual habits in
public life, it would seem just the opposite is the case. “Moral judgment” is judg-
ment that can point to considerations that can be plausibly put forward as having
weight in a moral context. When reasons along those lines no longer apply, or are
shown never to have applied, then the feeling that remains, if one does remain,
has little authority, perhaps none at all. If you look at our actual habits in public
life, it would seem this is how we regard feelings we cannot justify. They are but
residues or shadows of judgment, and do not merit full blown endorsement. So
what does this “experiment” show, after all? Not that moral life is pure feeling.
Rather, that pure feeling is not yet moral life.
And now a few words about the example, just because I promised. Typically,
we make judgments about types or kinds of actions. Of course, how “types” are
to be made out, and what description is warranted by the facts in play, can be a
very vexed question. Is this racially charged talk free expression or incitement?
Does it make a difference whether you take someone’s property using a false
credit card or a gun? (Yes, it does.) But that is not our problem here. In this case,
in the incest example above, we are asked to imagine the action-type, but then
without the features that typically attend the type. What is before us then is quite
suspicious. Among other things, we are asked to assume the parties “keep it a
secret.” I thought it was well established after John Rawls’ “Two Concepts of
Rules” (where we imagine an objectionable practice that is hidden from view,
unknown to be operative, the benefits of which allegedly demonstrating what is
wrong with utilitarianism) that practices are to be assessed publicly if they are
to be truly assessed at all. Nothing follows about anything (certainly nothing fol-
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lows about telishment and the plausibility of utilitarianism) should we imagine a
practice and then imagine it also not meeting the publicity criterion. Why not ask
these same students to “assess” a rigid caste system, but where it is also under-
stood that all parties in the lower castes are hypnotized into believing they are in
fact being treated well (the Brave New World case)? After all, having false be-
liefs about a practice is having false beliefs about a practice—it does not matter
how such false beliefs come about. What would that “thought experiment” show
us about caste systems, or about our judgments of them? I would say: absolutely
nothing. Or consider this: someone deceptively alters another’s will, but in order
to give all the proceeds to a charity; we of course also assume that the rightful
heirs are well provided for from other sources (no bad consequences, see?), and
of course, the initial deception is never discovered and so kept a secret. What
would you say to that, huh? If I were asked this question, I would just laugh.
Once you take away the results or features that are tied to an action type in the
typical case, and then ask, well what do you think of that act or practice now, of
course there will be uncertainty and confusion. Our judgments, to the contrary,
are well founded, well justified, in so far as we can point to consequences of an
action, or features of the action, that warrant praise or condemnation That is what
we in fact do when justifying a judgment. Moral judgment is rooted in consider-
ations. Take away those considerations, ask for a response all the same, and the
results, whatever they are, will show you nothing about the nature of that practice
or about the nature of moral judgment. And to the contrary, to go back to point
made above, if we come to think that the considerations we once thought did at-
tach to an action type in fact do not (the condemnation of homosexual behavior
case, the seduction case), then, whatever “feelings” do persist are not going to be
given very much weight or moral authority.
And finally, just where is the evidence for the remarkable claim that the
normative judgment of, e.g., foolishness, goes hand in hand with some sort of af-
fective response, in this case, pity? When I say, “Stalin was very foolish to think
Hitler would not attack the Soviet Union” or “Hitler was very foolish to extend
his armies as far as Stalingrad” where in heaven’s name is the pity? The claim is
simply ridiculous. And here is the central thing: if any of these claims just taken
up were the counterpart claims in the philosophy of language, you can be sure,
Ridge would be exacting in his examination. Different views would be canvassed,
different arguments meticulously summarized and assessed. The bibliography
would positively swell with references to important articles by important philoso-
phers. But if it is a claim about our moral life, a breezy unexamined assertion
will do. No mention of the contrary position, let alone rehearsal of the contrary
argument, need be made, even if the contrary positions are held by some of the
most formidable thinkers in the history of moral philosophy. Why is this? I think
we must say it is simply because these misrepresentations are the ones that fit
the expressivist program. The whole argument in Impassioned Beliefs is like an
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exquisitely made mechanical model of the Ptolemaic universe. The underlying
assumptions are never examined critically, just the internal workings of what
follows if those assumptions are granted. But the assumptions are almost every-
where implausible.
MOTIVATION
Expressivists are internalists. That is, expressivists hold that there is an internal
relation between a judgment that X is good and being motivated to do X (or, be-
tween judging that X is good and having some reason among others to do X,
or however else you wish to put the point). Indeed, this feature of the view is
typically put forward by expressivists as a near decisive reason in favor of the
expressivist argument. Here again, the original Humean argument is more or less
wholly intact: it is the same argument, essentially, as Hume’s original claim that
“reason can never supply a motive.” Facts, or detections of facts, cannot on their
own motivate (obviously) and since morality does motivate, moral properties
cannot then name facts in the world. On a more modern note, ever since John
Mackie taunted what he imagined moral realists to be with the “queerness” of
the idea that “to be done-ness” could be “woven into” a fact (and truly, how silly
is that?), it has seemed to many that we really should have an account of moral
predication in which judgments of goodness are logically, conceptually tied to
motivation from the start. If claims of “goodness” express a pro-attitude, the ap-
proval or endorsement of some plan, then it would seem at least that difficulty
has been met more or less perfectly. Ridge could not put his commitment to in-
ternalism more strongly:
Belief qua representational state cannot motivate all on its own. It needs the
help of desire. The belief that grass is green represents the world as being
a certain way, but this does not in itself motivate someone who believes it
to act one way rather than another. Even the belief that something will be
painful will not motivate someone who is depressed and thereby rendered
listless, or thinks he deserves pain… Moreover, our implicit conception of
normative judgments as distinctively motivating is not best understood as
a merely contingent fact about those judgments. The thesis is rather that
simply qua their particular character and content, first person normative
judgments are necessarily capable of motivating without the help of any
independent desire. Call this doctrine “Capacity Judgment Internalism,” or
“CJI” for short. CJI is a necessary truth about the nature of normative judg-
ment. (49-50)
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Ridge may simply not have noticed that his actual language here is fatally im-
precise. To say a normative judgment is necessarily capable of motivating says
very little. For, after all, this is consistent with the easy-going counterfactual “if
the agent had had the right character, then his judgment would have caused him
to act.” (The judgment as such remains credited with this “capacity.”) And now,
it is hard to know who could disagree. (No wonder it is a necessary truth.) Later
on, Ridge makes the claim more clearly. Internalism is committed to denying the
possibility of a moral agent making “full-blooded moral judgments” while at the
same time being “entirely unmoved by them.” (51) And this then would seem to
rule out the very idea of “the amoralist,” a figure made famous by Dostoevsky, of
great use to adjuncts in intro courses, and understood to embody just this possi-
bility. (51-52)
Ridge spends a great deal of energy on this particular challenge to internal-
ism. Once again, surveys are cited: here students are asked whether they think a
psychopathic criminal really understands the judgments he never abides by, and
while many (naively) do say “yes,” questions are raised, naturally, as to whether
“understanding that” and “belief in” are adequately distinguished in these thought
experiments. So, I understand unicorns have horns, but I do not believe in uni-
corns. Might something along those lines be the right way to understand the
psychopath? (52—54) Armed with considerations like these, Ridge thinks he can
battle his opponent to a draw, and perhaps he is right when we take a case as
extreme as this. (“The appeal to folk intuition about the possibility of amoralism
leads, at best, to a stalemate.” 54)
But suppose we leave such high drama aside and ask if there could just be, in
everyday life, by ordinary people, what I would call normative detection without
motivation. And here the answer seems to be, “sure; why not?” And here again,
it will be helpful to move away from the abstract term “good” and take up instead
normative concepts more or less criteria governed. Consider “deserves.” It seems
very obvious that one could say “yes, I can see that Smith deserves this raise, but
I am just not interested in giving it to him.” This certainly does not seem very
hard to imagine to me. Or: “It is very compassionate of Peter S. to give to the
poor as he does, no doubt about that, but I just do not have that interest.” Con-
sider also the application of normative terms in art, or the law. So, when we see
that (or come, as a result of our deliberations given the testimony and the facts, to
judge that) the nightclub owner was negligent, what follows motivationally? Ab-
solutely nothing. When a musician says, yes, Debussy’s late piano work is very
expressive, but I myself do not respond very deeply to that genre—do we feel
he cannot possibly be using the word correctly, cannot know what he is talking
about, cannot really understand the concept in play? I do not think so.
In the interests of full disclose, I should say that not only do I not think tying
moral judgment to motivation in a “logical” (or any excessively strong) way is
right, I do not frankly see much point. It seems obvious we can attribute nor-
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mative predicates all the time without this having any connection whatsoever to
motivation or response. And it seems obvious that those who take this line can
easily make sense of how we come to be moved by moral argument by a differ-
ent sort of story. This was Mill’s view, famously—whatever your view of “the
good” is, he argued, you will need to tell some further story about how we come,
through upbringing and education, to be motivated to do it (“Of the Ultimate
Sanction of the Principle of Utility”). That has always seemed right to me. (The
only reason you might not think it is so is if you thought “the good” had no spe-
cific content, named mere approval; then the argument’s initial premise does not
really apply.) But more generally, this dispute is, I think, a largely fruitless one.
What happens in these arguments is that inevitably, for the internalist, being mo-
tivated is simply made the criterion for “really understanding” that N is the case,
by definition. It is not a definition I myself recommend but, like most analytic
claims, it is not easily engaged by experience.
ECUMENICAL EXPRESSIVISM
And now to the heart of Ridge’s distinctive contribution to the expressivist argu-
ment, what he calls Ecumenical Expressivism. Ecumenical Expressivism is the
view that normative judgments are to be thought of as a kind of hybrid, as be-
ing constituted by a desire (roughly) and a belief. But it remains expressivism,
and not cognitivism, which of course could also admit of a hybrid form, because:
1) the content of the moral claim is driven by the desire (or “approval” or “pro-
attitude”), and 2) the normative content of the moral claim does not have truth
conditions; it is not to be thought of as making any representations about the
world that in turn could be true or false. By contrast, the belief in question is a
real belief—it has representational content, it is to be thought of in terms of the
world to mind fit. And, most gratifyingly, it can be true, not simply in the some-
what evasive sense that is available to us when within the deflationist theory of
truth, but under any conception of “truth” you like. This is a substantive moti-
vation behind Ecumenical Expressivism—we have, in it, a form of expressivism
that is not hostage to the deflationary theory of truth being deemed right in time
(our theory is not, as Ridge would say, “hostage to fortune” here). Rather, for
once, it would seem, an expressivist can say moral discourse is “truth apt,” as
such; or, regardless of whatever theory of truth you think will be vindicated.
Unfortunately, this “advantage” turns out to be trivial. And that is because
the “belief” in question is trivial—or more accurately, what this belief represents,
what bits of the world it picks out, is trivial, attesting only to what one might
call the minimal competence of a speaker’s understanding what his “normative
commitments” actually in fact entail. But this is not the most serious difficulty
with Ecumenical Expressivism; not at all. The most serious difficulty with Ec-
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umenical Expressivism is that it redescribes normative judgment in a way that
makes moral justification, and moral theory, invisible. Justification, supporting
one’s judgment by reference to considerations taken to be relevant in the context
at hand, disappears. Moral theory, which is simply a comprehensive or wide rang-
ing justification story regarding general principles as well as particular actions,
disappears. Instead, what we have is “approval”—and we have it twice over. We
approve of a “normative perspective,” and a “normative perspective” is simply an
approval function, a brute, not itself to be justified preference for action types of a
certain kind, where the kind, hopefully, can always be specified in a suitably non-
moral vocabulary. (It often can’t, but we will get to that difficulty separately.)
Here is Ridge:
An agent’s normative perspective just is a set of relatively stable self-gov-
erning policies about which standards to reject and accept. More specif-
ically, a normative perspective in my sense is a set of relatively stable
policies against accepting certain kinds of standards of deliberation. (115)
…I propose that to say the judgments of the form ‘X is good as an end’
can be understood as equivalent to judgments of the following form:
‘X would be highly ranked as an end by any acceptable ultimate stan-
dard of practical reasoning.’
…However, any token of this [non-representational] belief type is on
my view itself necessarily a hybrid state. More specifically, any such token
will be constituted by a normative perspective and a representational belief
whose contents are linked in the right way. So any token of (1) will be con-
stituted by:
1a) A normative perspective.
1b) The [representational] belief that X would be highly ranked as an
end by any admissible ultimate standard of practical reasoning.
[W]e then understand the judgment so paraphrased as a relational state,
such that any token of that state type will necessarily be a normative per-
spective/representational belief pair. The content of the representational
belief…is fixed by replacing all uses of ‘acceptable’…with ‘admissible,’
where this in turn is defined relative to speaker’s normative perspective.
(119-120; additions SR; italics Ridge)
Even by the very forgiving standards of current meta-ethics, this last passage is
not as clear as it could be. Ridge has changed his account of what is distinctive
about Ecumenical Expressivism from earlier versions, but, as the reader will see,
not by very much, and for purposes of clarification, it is worth reproducing one
of those earlier descriptions here.
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On the version of Ecumenical Expressivism I favor, normative utterances
express:
1. A suitable state of approval to actions insofar as they would garner
the approval of a certain sort of advisor.
And
2. A belief which makes suitable anaphoric reference back to that
advisor.
The basic idea is best illustrated through examples. Suppose I am a util-
itarian. In that case, my claim that charity is right expresses my perfectly
general attitude of approval to actions insofar as they would garner the ap-
proval of a certain sort of advisor, which in this case is an advisor who
approves of actions just insofar as they promote happiness. My claim also
expresses a belief which makes anaphoric reference back to that advisor
(the one which figures in the content of the attitude I expressed). In this
case, the belief is that such an advisor would approve of charity. (Ridge,
“The Truth in Ecumenical Expressivism,” 2009)
Parenthetically: Ridge moves from his earlier account, where an agent approves
of what some ideal observer would approve of and also (representationally) be-
lieves that such approval extends to this case here, to the language of Impassioned
Beliefs, with its talk of normative perspectives and what such perspectives do
and do not exclude (what would and would not be “admissible” under that per-
spective) because he thinks such talk better fits first order experience. After all,
people usually have not embraced some pre-existing theory wholesale when mak-
ing a judgment in a particular case, and to have a stable normative standpoint just
is best thought of in terms of what is ruled out, what you won’t do—what you
will do, or might do, is often yet to be determined, is still “on the table” (115).
These changes are not important to us now. What is fundamental to Ridge’s
Ecumenical Expressivism—the “hybrid” story, what is and what is not represen-
tational—remains exactly the same.
Now that the reader has the basic idea, I reproduce here a few more passages
that develop it, and draw out some of the more important implications.
Because what is expressed is a deflationist belief type and the type in ques-
tion is multiply realizable, there is no particular normative perspective /
representational belief pair expressed by a given token claim. The [non-rep-
resentational] belief that the wealthy are morally required to give to charity
can be partly constituted by a representational belief about consequentialist
standards, or about standards fixed by what God commands, or about stan-
dards fixed by what treats people with respect… and so on ad infinitum.
(196)
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Normative judgments are therefore massively multiply realizable. There
are indefinitely many possible normative perspectives, and so there are in-
definitely many relational states [where the particular normative judgment
follows from a normative perspective/representational belief pair—SR]
which can constitute a given normative judgment. (121)
There are two distinct, equally important things going on. One is a set of claims
about how representational beliefs figure in normative judgments; they are said
to “partly constitute” a normative judgment, and this is what is going to make
such judgments “truth-apt,” quite regardless of your particular theory of truth.
The other is a claim about “multiple realizability,” that normative judgments are
multiply realizable (actually, “massively” multiply realizable) because they can
easily be conjoined with a variety of normative perspectives (and so, of course,
with a variety of normative perspective / representational belief hybrid pairs). So,
to illustrate, the normative judgment token, “giving to charity is good,” can easily
be combined with a Kantian normative perspective, a utilitarian normative per-
spective, and so forth. And of course, each of these will be conjoined with the
representational belief that from each such perspective, one would approve of
charity. It would be true that one with this perspective would approve of this act,
or action type.
But the claim that the representational belief “partly constitutes the normative
judgment” is, I submit, extremely misleading. The representational belief Ridge
refers to here is “about consequentialist standards” (to stay with the earlier exam-
ple) only in the most minimal and, I would say, trivial way. Let us first make clear
what it is not, what it cannot be. It is not a belief that consequentialist standards
are well founded, or are justified. That belief could not possibly be representa-
tional, on the expressivist view, obviously. No; this “belief” is the belief that, if
you were a consequentialist, you would then find this act, whatever it is, impli-
cated by your view. Or: consequentialists, as a matter of fact, do approve of this
act. That is the belief. It is the more or less B-or-better answer a student might
give on a philosophy mid-term exam to the question “what do consequentialists
think?” Because that is the only thing we can say about consequentialism that
admits of “representational” character, that can be characterized in terms of that
almighty God, the world to mind fit. And that is the degree to which this “be-
lief” is “about consequentialism.” Forgive me, I find this almost ridiculous. It is
nothing more than an expression of semantic competence; in holding this “be-
lief,” the agent shows he truly does understand what consequentialism is, that’s
all. (The point is simply rephrased when we speak, in the later work, of what
some normative perspective allows or excludes.) This amounts to a meager, to
me, virtually pointless, difference from those forms of expressivism that simply
leave such “representational beliefs” out altogether. Since such beliefs in no way
speak to the plausibility or acceptability of the content of the normative perspec-
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tive, what does it add to expressivism to include them? Why not equally say: “and
in addition I know it is I who am making this judgment,” and make that the “con-
stitutive representational belief” that will always be truth apt regardless of your
truth theory? It is a novel addition to expressivism, and it has received a lot of
attention. But it is also a strange and silly one. It shows the degree to which ex-
pressivism is anxious to be able to claim that normative judgments really can be
truth apt. And in Ridge’s case, it shows an admirable sensitivity to the danger, not
at all noticed by Blackburn or Gibbard, that in relying, for success at this ambi-
tion, on a deflationist theory of truth, one may be relying on a theory that in time
may become discredited. But it is a mere gimmick; it is no solution at all. This
“representational belief” simply takes the implications of the content of the nor-
mative perspective as its object. Whatever connection there is between this view
and the world, however plausible or implausible the view itself may be, (for this
will depend, of course, on the view itself), never even arises. As Ridge himself
concedes, the overall “judgment,” with this artificial addition sown onto it, can
now be said to be “truth apt,” but nothing about the normative perspective under-
stood as such can be said to be so. Utilitarian principles, utilitarian reasons (or
those of the chosen normative perspective, to use the later language) cannot for
a moment be thought of as true, and cannot be assessed in this way at all. One’s
normative (non-representational) beliefs are no more truth apt than one’s inner
desire for an ice cream cone.
I should say: strictly speaking, this is fine with me. I do not think, as I will
argue below, moral theories should be assessed against “the language of truth,”
I don’t think we “unhesitatingly” apply the truth predicate to our normative
judgments. The language of justification is the one to use. But the expressivist
must pursue this issue against a particular, forbidding framework: there are
representational states that mirror the world and so can be true on one hand, non-
representational states on the other, and he wants to say moral claims, which
cannot in any sense be about the world, nevertheless can be truth apt all the same.
It’s a hard square to circle, especially if you don’t hide behind the Unitarianism of
the day, a deflationist theory of truth. Now, normally, when we worry about truth
in moral discourse, we wonder if the application of a normative judgment-predi-
cate to a state of affairs is right. Is capital punishment (really) wrong; is charity
(really) obligatory? Are these claims “true”? This, I submit, is the natural way in
which the issue arises. But Ridge has us speaking instead of the semantic entail-
ments of a doctrine. Is it true that the doctrines of utilitarianism require some acts
of charity? Is it true that my normative perspective allows me here to lie? I leave
it to the reader to decide what sort of advance this represents.
What about the claim regarding multiple realizability? One might think this is
innocuous enough, hardly worth arguing about. Isn’t it obvious that, as a matter of
fact, different (what I would call) moral theories will often reach similar verdicts
about similar action types? Sure; but Ridge’s language here is also very mislead-
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ing. The reality, where moral judgment is concerned, is far more interesting and
more complicated. And as a result, the relation between judgment and “perspec-
tive” (again, what I would call theory) is no type-token relation, that is for sure.
There is in fact already with us an ongoing, stable, normative practice where
something more or less identical to what Ridge mentions here is an everyday af-
fair. In legal decisions reached by a panel of judges, there is a category known
as the concurrence. One can join the holding; one can dissent; one can write a
concurrence. What is a concurrence? It is agreement with the majority that one or
the other party does in fact win, but for very different reasons. Justice Kennedy
agrees with Justice Scalia and the plurality that Seattle’s racial redistribution plan
is unconstitutional, (and so he votes, with Scalia, for the parents who brought suit)
but not because he thinks Seattle has no legitimate purpose, as The Court’s deci-
sion states. Kennedy thinks Seattle’s purpose is just fine (he joins the dissent in
this), but that Seattle failed to show it could not achieve it by race neutral means.
So, to use Ridge like language, he makes the same judgment, but from a different
(let us call it this, just to keep things simple) “normative perspective.” But is it
the same judgment? Is it really a token of the same type? I would not say so. Nor
would Kennedy, nor would anyone wondering about the future of such litigation.
And here is why: obviously, the two claims admit of very different counterfactu-
als, and that is not something we should ever be able to say about two tokens of
the same type. So, if another city did show race neutral means could not work to
achieve this end, Scalia would still find it unconstitutional, Kennedy would not
(each makes this point perfectly clear). That is why there is the category of the
concurrence to begin with. It is important, not just what verdicts we reach, but
our reasons for reaching them. Because the reasons make clear what the verdict
really is, what you really hold, when you say “so and so is right.”
And lest this seem a fussy artifact of mere legal reasoning, consider the fol-
lowing. Suppose you are a libertarian along Ayn Rand like lines, and I am a
utilitarian. We both say “private property rights should be respected.” Fine. Do
we mean the same thing? Is this a “judgment token” that in turn is being “multi-
ply realized,” realized alongside different normative perspective/ representational
belief pairs? Well, sure, maybe, in one sense. We do assert the same sentence,
and we certainly disagree with the imagined Marxist who asserts the contrary.
But, because of the different justification stories we hold, very different coun-
terfactuals will hold too, and this, the difference in counterfactuals, is crucial in
normative life. I am utilitarian; I am quite at ease with understanding these prop-
erty rights in incremental ways. I think inheritance tax is fine, adverse possession
is fine, various degrees of state interference with property, like use regulations or
landmark regulations, are fine. You are a pure libertarian; you do not think any
of these things are fine at all. So we won’t together assent as soon as we imag-
ine any of these things arising, (for example, a tax on property inheritance) and
asking if they are justified. Do we mean the same thing when we say private prop-
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erty rights must be respected? Do we mean the same thing when we use the word
property? If we say yes, it is sort of surprising how quickly we are going to dis-
agree as we continue to talk about property and property rights. And I certainly
don’t want to say “no, we do not mean the same thing” in the tired old sense in
which “it would then follow” that “we are not in fact really disagreeing after all,
because we do not mean the same thing.” How silly is that! We disagree, because
we hold different theories of property. This is obvious. It was certainly obvious
to Marx. But it is obscured if you focus on a sentence. And to return to the earlier
point, the one raised by the very category of the concurrence, why feel we have to
say yes or no here to begin with? Why have to answer: “does the sentence mean
the exact same thing in both cases, or not?” Why not just say, what I have just
said—we assert the same sentence, but because we offer different justifications,
hold different theories, the meaning of the sentence is not quite the same for the
two speakers. I realize it is a long time since the pieties of Word and Object were
on everyone’s lips, but whatever happened to the old saw that sentences face the
world not singly but holistically, as part of a web of theory? Change the web, and
surely you change the sentence. (Consider: when a Muslim, Evangelical Protes-
tant, and Hindu say “there is a God”—and surely they all do—do they utter the
same sentence token and mean the same thing? Let’s see that one worked out
then.) In law, the importance of this distinct category is explicitly affirmed from
the start; it is woven into how we understand the practice. If you were to ask a
lawyer “Do Scalia and Kennedy mean the same thing when they say the Seattle
plan is unconstitutional?” he would look at you funny, and rightly. The answer is
clear: they reach the same verdict for different reasons. That’s why we have the
category of a concurrence to begin with, and why Kennedy writes one here. They
“mean the same thing” in one sense, not in another. It is not so hard to keep this
more complicated answer in mind.
Throughout the past few paragraphs, I have, as the reader will have surely no-
ticed I am sure, used “justification” and “theory” talk where Ridge would speak
instead of “approval” and “normative perspective.” And this difference—which
speaks to my inability even to describe what goes on in moral life when using
only the language expressivism prefers—brings me to what is I think the deepest
flaw in Ecumenical Expressivism. Ecumenical Expressivism is unable to make
sense of the distinctive nature of justification; indeed, justification, as I have said
before, is actually quite invisible in this framework. Instead, expressivism seeks
to characterize what goes on in justification using the much weaker notion, “ap-
proval.” In this respect, I want to suggest an intentionally unflattering parallel
between the expressivist project and reductionism in philosophy of mind, the
reductionist characterization of intentional acts solely in terms of physical causa-
tion stories for example. Of course, every intentional act is also a physical event,
and so admits of that description too. But so what? That hardly means we capture
what is central about intentional action in the language of physical causation. We
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do not. And of course any policy or action I think justified is one I will, obvi-
ously, also “approve of.” That follows almost grammatically. But approval is a
far weaker notion, and does not capture the nature of justification at all.
An illustration here may help. Let us consider the utilitarian argument. Mill
does not simply “approve of” maximizing utility. What a caricature that is! Mill
thinks this policy is warranted, given certain plausible assumptions. What are
these assumptions? Here is a sketch of some of them: we assume that “utility”
is a reasonable metric to capture otherwise diverse objects of desire and/or the
value agents place on success in intentional action. We assume persons seek a
rule to manage their public cooperation and occasions of conflict, and we assume
persons will see themselves as entitled to be counted equally in any such rule.
Given these considerations, it follows, Mill thinks, that the rule, “have those poli-
cies that promote the greatest net utility for the relevant population,” is justified.
Certain considerations are pointed to as relevant to the project, certain ways of
managing these considerations are put forward as more satisfactory than others.
The reasons for such claims of relevance, or satisfactory management, in turn will
be tied to how we understand what it is that morality seeks to do. So for example,
the emphasis on equality, and the fact that in some important respects, utilitarian-
ism is quite egalitarian—these are considerations that count towards justifying the
theory. And the thought is: surely whatever else may be wrong with this theory,
paying attention to equality counts in favor of it. And this idea of some consid-
eration “counting in favor” of a theory cannot possibly be rephrased as a fact
about approval or pro-attitude. To the contrary, it is put forward as a fact about
the theory. But the idea that certain facts, or considerations, might support a the-
ory, that this might be a fact about some theories, and not others, can get no
foothold here. We can speak of causation—some facts might somehow “cause
goodness.” We can speak of detection, and so, if intuitionists, of “detecting”
goodness. If goodness were indeed a natural or non-natural fact, we could have
representational beliefs about it. And by contrast, we can speak of “approval,” a
non-representational state (of course), in which we seek to settle “the thing to do”
(somehow). But there is no place for the central phenomenon, for what writers
like Mill and Kant for example actually undertook—pointing to certain consid-
erations in support of a certain conception, or theory, of moral goodness. And
this is also what we do, more or less, when elaborating upon our particular moral
judgments. We go back and forth between those facts we think relevant and the
more general or theoretical considerations that make sense of such importance.
No one “just approves of” promise keeping. (Well, a child might be taught to
speak this way.) We think it is right because of the respect it shows the one to
whom the promise has been given, or because of the stability of expectations such
a practice makes possible. No one “just approves” of giving modest amounts of
money to the desperately poor. One thinks it is right because of the great benefit
given to other persons (who will be thought of as creatures that must count) for
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little sacrifice. The phenomenon here, generally understood, is not so different
from justification elsewhere. I support, I try to justify, my view that Lawrence is
a better writer than Forster by pointing to certain facts about each, and by point-
ing to what I hope are fairly persuasive ways of understanding literature. I don’t
“just approve” of Smith over Hoskins; I try to justify my view that this candidate
rather than that one deserves an offer of admission in light of certain facts about
the candidate and how I understand the point of philosophy. We offer more or
less general considerations that we hope take account of the central cases well,
and support one particular judgment over another elsewhere. We offer these con-
siderations in light of a theory we are prepared to defend of what is important
here, and what is not, and all of this will be subject to criticism. So, when con-
sidering utilitarian theory, the consequences of being willing to treat welfare in
an aggregative manner is rightly subject to criticism, however much some die
hard utilitarian might insist he “just approves.” But the expressivist can make no
sense of these central phenomena, justification and criticism, the very essence of
normative life. We have only the tools of naturalism—causation, detection, rep-
resentation, non-representational approval. The background framework makes it
impossible to capture the distinctive nature of justification and critical assessment
from the start. Under Ridge’s Ecumenical Expressivism, all we get, as I have said,
is ungrounded approval twice over. Moral theories, rebranded “normative per-
spectives,” are understood as mere approval machines. The utilitarian is someone
who “just approves” of maximizing pleasure, the Kantian of respecting persons,
and so on. Reasons for such conclusions, justification stories, are left out. And
agents for their part simply do or do not approve of such schemes of approval.
Moral theory is truncated, moral justification disappears.
BUT WHAT ABOUT THOSE STANDARDS?
When Ridge speaks of “admissible” standards, does this make a difference? After
all, justification invariably proceeds against some standard or other. Perhaps,
armed with a notion of admissible standards, the accusations above regarding
justification can be met. But in Ecumenical Expressivism, to say a standard is
“admissible” is not to attribute any intrinsic property to it. A standard is “admis-
sible” just in case if it is “not excluded” by whatever “normative perspective”
one has reached by deliberation. (“The content of the representational belief…is
fixed by replacing all uses of ‘acceptable’…with ‘admissible,’ where this in turn
is defined relative to speaker’s normative perspective.” 119-120)
As it happens, it is extremely unclear in Impassioned Beliefs what it means for
a standard to be “admissible” under a normative perspective, or conversely, what
it might mean for a standard to be excluded by one. From my point of view, this
is not that important a criticism, as I do not think the framework by which norma-
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tive perspectives are generated in the first place is at all satisfactory. But for those
attracted to developing Ridge’s project, as things stand, this is a serious instabil-
ity in the argument and someone should take it up. After all, “exclusion” cannot
be the same thing as mere difference. Presumably, my love of things Italian does
not exclude an interest in pursuing things Korean, a sensibility it happens I am
so far utterly indifferent towards. Does the idea require overt enmity then? Belief
in revenge-for-an-insult certainly excludes turn the cheek pacifism. But the line
between enmity and mere difference is elusive. Suppose my standards come from
a perspective that values highly earning money for my loved ones, yours from a
perspective that values solitary religious contemplation. It seems the perspective
of one excludes the standards of the other, but maybe not. Could I not have the
perspective that endorses doing one, then the other, sequentially? (This is in fact
a bit of folk wisdom in the Hindu tradition.) If you are an abstemious libertarian,
finding taking drugs and buying sex quite beneath you, but believing in maximal
personal freedom, what exactly does “your” normative perspective “exclude”? I
myself am at a loss to say. How “exclusion” within Ridge’s standard talk is to
be understood, is, I submit, actually a very tricky matter. I am skeptical there is a
clear way to fix this idea. But Ridge has little interest in it. An unexamined quasi-
logical operator (“exclude”) is just going to have to be enough.
Obviously, the real issue here is: can normative perspectives, or, the content
of the standards they fail to rule out (for they are the same thing), themselves be
assessed? And the answer is, yes, sort of, certainly in so far as we draw upon non-
controversial notions of psychology.
For a standard to function as a standard of practical reasoning is for it
to guide an agent in deliberating about what to intend and do…. Clearly,
this construal places no substantive constraints on the contents of standards
of practical reasoning. A standard which recommends always maximizing
one’s own agony can, for a given agent, be a standard of practical reasoning
just as well as a more sensible standard. This is as it should be, since people
can adopt absurd standards of practical reasoning…. Equally clearly though
we want some way to privilege standards of practical reasoning which we
think deserve to be taken seriously from those which do not. (40)
It is typical for the expressivist to “concede” a case like this. Sure, crazy standards
like these are logically possible, the passage tells us; my theory not only has no
ability to rule them out, it would be a mistake even to try. But that (rare, pecu-
liar) fact about rare and peculiar people need not distract us; it is hardly what
we usually find. And here Ridge is right—these cases don’t pose any interesting
problems. The case a reader assessing expressivism wants to see taken up and
satisfactorily handled will be the less exotic, all too familiar one where reason-
able self-interest and the morally awful intersect nicely. Consider a man with the
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standard that seeks to preserve the second class status of women. If this is not a
“sensible” standard, I need an argument to show me why. It has made many far
happier over the years than the pursuit of agony; that is for sure.
It might seem that I am now very far from the criticism I started with, that
expressivism is driven by the unsatisfactory framework it uncritically inherits
from Hume. After all, for Hume, our values (our standards) would have been
thought as largely fixed by nature. Deliberation would take up the best means to
ends that were themselves (almost always) generated by causation and not sub-
ject to assessment; in the expressivist argument, deliberation takes as its object
final ends themselves. But the Humean framework is driving expressivism here
all the same. Because normative judgment cannot be representational—and this
is quite right, given what “representational” can mean when within this frame-
work—if there is to be deliberation about ends, about standards, such “thought”
cannot be criteria governed. There is a lot of evasion before this point, much of
I think simply instinctive (not calculating); it is just not an appealing part of the
view that it has no real tools at its disposal to handle what we might call the wrong
sort of relativism. By that I mean, given how “good” or “ought” or “acceptabil-
ity” are understood when within expressivism, the theory cannot characterize a
plan or standard as “wrong” except as relative to whatever other standard that
one’s deliberation has led one to. That means the accusations of moral error moral
antagonists will make of one another must always be logically on a par. Now
sometimes this is just what we want. It is one thing to say “on my theory of how
“morally right” or “the right thing to do” is to be understood, there will be ac-
ceptable stories both defending and condemning capital punishment.” That seems
quite right. But it is quite another to say, “on my theory of how “morally right”
or “the right thing to do” is to be understood, there will be acceptable stories both
defending and condemning second class status for women.” That does not seem
right at all. But the expressivist must resist any talk of the nature of persons, or the
nature of morality (or anything else), generating criteria for satisfactory (or un-
satisfactory) norms. For in that case, normative deliberation would be (or should
be) about something, and we might as well just turn to what that something is.
The deliberation would be “derivative,” and the expressivist project would be
doomed. Consistent with the expressivist project, deliberation as such is all we
can offer. Value cannot be out there, cannot be a natural fact or a metaphysical
entity (this, happily, is true). Since value cannot figure in a world to mind repre-
sentational belief, there is nothing “out there” that can govern what goes on inside
our heads when we wonder about “what is best.” The result, again, is that delib-
eration itself, and what it aims at, is all we can point to.
Normative judgments function to settle “the thing to do” and normative
conversation allows us to deliberate together about the thing to do and en-
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hance our individual deliberation while also better coordinating our joint
efforts toward common goals. (101-102)
This ghastly, bloodless empty talk; always abundant in the writings of expres-
sivists. Whatever can it mean? What, more pointedly, if anything does it rule
out? One thinks of the young Wehrmacht officers, getting together, in a clubby,
congenial fashion on chilly autumnal evening in Poland, to think about all the
things they had to do, and to enhance their individual deliberations while explor-
ing their common goals. Across the border, NKVD apparatchiks worried how
best to advance the starvation in the Ukraine, meeting far into the night to discuss
techniques for disgorging hidden grain from those uncooperative peasants. Read-
ers may well find these remarks uncharitably harsh; I ask the reader however to
remember they describe actual events, not made up fantasy. And truly, they are
quite continuous with Ridge’s account of “locating the normative” in simply wor-
rying about having a child with which we began.
AND FINALLY, A FEW WORDS ABOUT TRUTH
One of the interesting ways in which current expressivists truly do differ from
the original Humean inheritance is on truth; specifically, on the capacity of moral
judgments to be thought of as truth apt. Expressivists may share Hume’s view
about how the world is to be divided—various natural and metaphysical facts
out there, reactions and attitudes in here—but Hume thought of our moral re-
sponses not simply as non-cognitive, but as states with no semantic content, and
so as states that could not be thought as true or false. The emotivists, Ayer and
Stevenson, followed Hume in this way, famously comparing moral judgments to
interjections or exhortations. And this leads to easy dismissal, for when under-
stood this way, moral judgments cannot even figure straightforwardly (as they
surely do) as objects of quantification, in embedded inference or implication
claims. (And this of course is the famous Frege-Geach problem, about which I
will on principle have absolutely nothing further to say.) Current expressivists
(Blackburn, Gibbard), usually affirming what has come to be called “quasi-real-
ism,” struggle strenuously to avoid this result. Moral claims can, it is said (by the
quasi-realist at any rate), be both non-representational and truth apt. When you
put it that way, it is pretty clear that such views will be happiest if “truth” turns
out to be something not signifying very much, which is to say, understood along
deflationist lines. Ridge sums up the quasi-realist position here nicely:
It is easy to see how this sort of deflationism [Blackburn’s, where calling
a sentence “true” is understood dispositionally, in terms of what inferences
are and are not warranted - SR] might seem like a powerful tool for quasi
Book Review | Ross
144
realists. Suppose there really is nothing more to saying that it is true that
charity is good than there is to saying charity is good. This suggests that the
expressivist can allow that normative sentences are truth-apt. The point will
simply be that in saying that it is true that charity is good one is expressing
one’s attitude in favor of charity in just the same way that one does when
one says that charity is good. (202)
It is to Ridge’s credit that this is not very satisfying for him—though this is
largely because he thinks, rightly, there are many general difficulties with defla-
tionism as a theory quite apart from what it says about normative discourse, and it
would be a pity if a theory as near-flawless as expressivism were to be so closely
tied to deflationism’s uncertain fortunes. I have already rehearsed what it is about
normative judgments that would be truth apt, according to Ridge, and why on
my view this account adds so very little. There is no need to go into that again. I
want instead to conclude with a few reflections on a remark Ridge makes when
ruminating on the puzzles that attend thinking about truth in normative discourse
generally, before he turns to his own view. Ridge considers a possibility rarely
entertained in these discussions, and then unsurprisingly, quickly sets it aside. But
on my view, this (to Ridge) almost crazy idea may contain the seeds of what is
exactly the right approach.
Mark Richard has argued at some length that expressivists should not be
so afraid of denying truth-aptness… [H]e usefully reminds us that ordinary
speakers do sometimes balk at the inference from ‘p’ to ‘p is true’. The fact
that such speakers sometimes speak loosely and use ‘true’ as a grammatical
device to indicate assent to a whole class of propositions does not show that
they think those propositions are really true. It is a platitude that people of-
ten speak loosely if it is a more efficient way to get their ideas across, after
all.
Richard himself is agnostic as to whether the logical space at which
he adverts is plausible in the case of moral thought and discourse, and for
good reason. In the moral context, I doubt very much that ordinary speak-
ers tend to use ‘true’ only loosely and as a grammatical device, where they
would (under Socratic pressure, say) distinguish this in some way from
“real truth.” If “is true” is always a mere grammatical device, then it will
be a grammatical device in these contexts too. What is implausible is that
some more robust conception of truth is correct more generally and avail-
able to speakers, but that competent speakers do not intend to invoke that
robust notion in normative contexts. (197)
Before taking up what Ridge terms implausible and what I think is in fact a
genuinely promising framework, I cannot resist noting the following. Has any-
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one ever noticed that expressivists are always trying to convince us that, on one
hand, it turns out that “ordinary people” simply have these brute unjustifiable
feelings driving their moral judgments (“I don’t know why I think this; incest is
just nasty!”) and at the same time, “unhesitatingly believe” their normative judg-
ments are “truth apt”? Of course there is only one way for both of these to be true
at the same time—all of us, it turns out, just are, instinctually, expressivists who
hold to a deflationist theory of truth. Like Socrates exposing the Platonic knowl-
edge even a slave has of the Forms, expressivists have revealed the deep, true,
philosophical commitments that just happen to be instinct in us all. (As if.)
Well, I am skeptical. The expressivist always insists ordinary people “unhesi-
tatingly” use the language of truth before their normative discourse—this is why
expressivists always quickly distance themselves, patronizingly, from A. J. Ayer.
But I think this claim needs to be examined, not repeated. Let us leave the world
of surveys of college students and look instead at some ongoing, stable, struc-
tured, normative practices, say literary criticism and legal interpretation. We can,
and will, return to the students afterwards.
I am very much not sure that those within these disciplines would say they
use “truth” in the “ordinary” sense at all. Of course, Justice Kennedy would say,
I think it is true that my reading of Concerned Parents v. Seattle Schools is bet-
ter than the Court’s, my understanding of “legitimate Constitutional purpose” is
more in line with what the post Brown v. Board of Topeka cases require, but to
say my reading is right (more awkwardly, “is true”—an expression I venture to
say he would never use, much less “unhesitatingly”), is to say my reading is more
justified. It is not to say there is some fact I am “detecting,” for there is not. It
is certainly not to say Scalia’s reading is false, in the sense that it has no merit
whatsoever.
And this brings us to an interesting, important, and rarely acknowledged
asymmetry in “ordinary usage” between truth talk and justification talk, and one
of the reasons why people often in fact do balk at using truth talk in normative
life, particularly in its “more robust” sense. When I say it is true that the earth re-
volves around the sun, I am also saying it is false that it doesn’t, and so it is false
that the sun moves around the earth. The fact, presumably, just is one way, and we
represent it, correctly, or not. Here is the familiar framework of the world to mind
fit, and for every unit of representation that seeks to picture the world a certain
way there can be no “degrees” of truth and falsity. But before complex intentional
structures—the law, the novel—there often will be a range of legitimate readings
available. And so the real central term of assessment here—“is justified”—will
admit of degrees. This is a very important part of how we understand normative
judgment. In saying Scalia is wrong, Kennedy is saying that his reading is more
justified than Scalia’s. He is not saying his reading is “true” and so Scalia’s must
be “false.” This is obvious. He is certainly not saying that Scalia’s reading cannot
be justified at all, or even that it does not admit of a relatively good justification
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story. He is saying simply that his justification story is at least a little bit better.
And the result is that ordinary people, knowing this fact about justification and
normative judgment, often do hesitate to use the language of truth “in its more
robust sense” before the normative judgments they put forward as right. They do
not wish to imply that the opposing, or contrary, or rival judgments are necessar-
ily without merit. (My students at least talk this way all the time.) It would be very
interesting to see how the expressivist would characterize grading, that very or-
dinary business of assessing the written work of young philosophers. (And surely
this is a normative practice if any is, though I am not sure anyone is “settling the
thing to do.”) Is it that each sentence is either true or false (this is the language
of assessment we “unhesitatingly apply,” remember?) and we add up the net av-
erage? No; this does not sound like a very plausible account of grading to me.
Rather we look at the degree to which the claims are justified. Yes, that sounds
like a better description to me. I submit, before the expressivist can tell me with
confidence what in fact goes on in moral life, let me hear his account of grading
and find that plausible. I am quite serious.
Now, of course, there are some deep, important asymmetries between moral
judgment and grading, or the law. Arguably, the standards in moral life are less
settled (but one should not exaggerate the degree to which they are fixed in grad-
ing or legal interpretation either—obviously, or it would not matter so much
which President appoints which Justices). And sometimes, in any normative do-
main, there will be cases where we feel there is no rival to a particular justified
judgment. For many, this is when talk of “truth” seems most natural, i.e. when no
plausible rival justification story is on hand. And these are the examples beloved
in meta-ethical debate, particularly, now, by so-called “realists”: it is true that
“Rape is wrong!” it will be said, and with a particular tone of voice too. I do not
dispute it, I do dispute that this shows what it is typically taken to show. It does
not show we are detecting a mind independent fact and that our judgments are
truth apt because of that fact. It is instead more plausible to say that here, no good
justification story can challenge the justification (or condemnation) story on of-
fer. We rarely see as an example of “truth-apt” normative discourse a sentence
like the following: it is true that “Capital punishment cannot be justified!” One
wants to say to that last remark: Really? Not at all? That can’t be right; of course
it can, to some degree. But that sort of talk is exactly what is not available to
us when within the more robust conception of truth that appropriately operates
in naturalistic discourse. If p is true, then not-p must be false. But if Kennedy’s
view is well justified, well supported it does not follow that Scalia’s cannot be
justified at all. And I think in fact, far from “unhesitatingly” reaching for the truth
predicate when complimenting their moral judgments, most moral agents are in-
stinctively attuned to the scalar and non-exclusionary nature of justification, and
so instinctively hesitate, instinctively feel squeamish, using ordinary notions of
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truth or falsity to modify the many normative judgments they make, for they also
know the rivals to these judgments are usually not without some plausibility too.
OK; let’s do what expressivists do all the time. Let’s just assume that the
account of normative discourse I just gave is right. What, from the standpoint
of truth, follows? Well, very little actually. One could be deflationist, of course.
Being a deflationist about truth as a predicate leaves wide open how you think
assessment operates within particular domains. Deflationism simply tells you:
don’t look for a “theory of truth” to tell you how “is true” operates in science, in
law, in etiquette, in games, and so forth and so on. As Wittgenstein would have
said, don’t theorize here; just look and see. And that would be fine with me; on
my view of normative discourse, the central term of assessment here is “is jus-
tified,” and any truth talk that made any sense, that in any way seemed natural,
would always refer to that concept, would always have that term embedded in
it. So we could certainly say “Kennedy’s reading is more justified than Scalia’s”
is true. Or, in the moral case: “liberal egalitarianism is more justified than the
caste system” is true. And these sentences would mean no more and no less than
Kennedy’s reading is more justified than Scalia’s, and that liberal equalitarianism
is more justified than the caste system. That would be fine (that would be, in fact,
how it is). But one could equally well say: “When I talk of truth, I want a more
robust notion, something about “matching the world” where it is understood that
sentences either do or do not do this. Normative discourse, with its commitment
to justification, and degrees of justification, can’t be thought of this way.” That
would also be fine with me. I cannot see why it matters from the standpoint of
normative theory. So long as we do not disfigure what normative life is in fact
like to fit our theory of truth, so long as we are faithful to its distinctive structure,
we should be easy going about what conception of truth in the end is deemed the
right one. If it turns out that there is a general theory of truth that actually fits
what goes on in each domain, that each domain can be plausibly thought of as an
instance of this general account, fine. If it turns out that the best theory of truth
is one that can be said to apply only in some domains, and in others, we are bet-
ter off speaking of other notions that are not (on this account) quite the same as
truth, like “justification,” that would also be fine. What matters is simply being
faithful to the underlying domain. Where moral life is concerned, this means that
what counts (above all) is doing justice to the distinctive structure of justification,
not turning it into the detection of some fact, natural or otherwise, or the act of
approval. Get the domain right; get the domain right; get the domain right. But
the expressivists never do.
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